The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive Automaker Enterprise Liability by Logue, Kyle D.
Journal of Law and Mobility 
Volume 2019 
2019 
The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive Automaker Enterprise 
Liability 
Kyle D. Logue 
University of Michigan Law School, klogue@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/jlm 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons, Torts Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kyle D. Logue, The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive Automaker Enterprise Liability, 2019 J. L. & MOB. 
1 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/jlm/vol2019/iss1/1 
https://doi.org/10.36635/jlm.2019.deterrence 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and Mobility by an authorized editor of University 




THE DETERRENCE CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE AUTOMAKER 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
KYLE D. LOGUE† 
Cite as: Kyle D. Logue, The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive 
Automaker Enterprise Liability,  
2019 J. L. & MOB. 1. 
This manuscript may be accessed online at https://futurist.law.umich.edu 
and at https://repository.law.umich.edu/jlm/. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Automobiles are much safer today than they used to be. Perhaps the best 
illustration of this fact is the decades’ long decline in the number of auto-
related deaths per-mile-driven.1 And yet motor vehicles—including cars, 
trucks, and SUVs— continue to be among the most dangerous products sold 
anywhere. Automobiles pose a larger risk of accidental death than any other 
product, except perhaps for opioids.2 Annual auto-crash deaths in the United 
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Autonomous Vehicles held at Wake Forest University School of Law and from his 
Michigan Law colleagues at a Fawley Lunch Workshop in Ann Arbor. Thanks also to 
Bryant Walker Smith for his comments and notes.  
 1. General Statistics: Fatality Facts, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY: HIGHWAY 
LOSS DATA INST., https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/over 
view-of-fatality-facts (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (showing motor vehicle crash deaths 
per 100 million miles driven has declined from 3.35 in 1976 to 1.18 in 2016). 
 2. In 2016, which is the most recent year for which the Centers for Disease Control 
has final data as of the time of this writing, there were 58,335 deaths attributable to 
accidental poisoning, which includes accidental deaths from drug overdose (which, of 
course, includes accidental opioid overdose). JIAQUAN XU ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 34 (vol. 67, no. 5 July 
26, 2018) [henceforth, CDC, 2016 Final Death data]. The CDC estimates that roughly 
42,000 deaths in 2016 were attributable to opioids, the vast majority of which would 
presumably be considered accidental deaths. Drug Overdose Death Data, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths 
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States have never fallen below 30,000, reaching a recent peak of roughly 
40,000 in 2016.3 In addition to these tens of thousands (internationally, 
millions4) of deaths attributable to motor-vehicle crashes, there are many 
other social costs. Victims of serious auto accidents, for example, often incur 
extraordinary medical expenses both to provide treatment immediately after 
the accident and, sometimes, to provide treatment for the rest of their lives.5 
Those crash victims whose injuries render them unable to work can 
experience weeks, months, even years of lost income, which, from their 
employers’ perspective, is lost productivity.6 Auto accidents also cause non-
trivial amounts of property damage, mostly to the automobiles themselves 
though also occasionally to highways, bridges, or other elements of 
transportation infrastructure. Finally, serious motor vehicle accidents often 
cause severe noneconomic injuries—that is, severe “pain and suffering”—as 
a result of accident victims’ painful and debilitating physical injuries. 
According to some estimates, such noneconomic harms, in the aggregate, 
amount to more than twice the magnitude of the aggregate economic 
damages caused by auto accidents.7 
All of this may be about to change. According to many auto-industry 
experts, the eventual transition to driverless vehicles will drastically lower 
the economic and noneconomic costs of auto accidents.8 Why might this be 
 
.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). Note also that firearms are involved in more deaths 
per year than motor vehicles, but the vast majority of those deaths are caused 
intentionally, either suicide (22,938 deaths in 2016) or homicide (14,415). The other 
leading causes of accidental deaths that year included the following: falls (34,673), 
firearms (495), and drowning (3,786). CDC, 2016 Final Death data, at 50. 
 3. For 2016, there were 40,327 motor-vehicle-related accidental deaths. CDC, 2016 
Final Death data, at 52. 
 4. Internationally, the number of annual fatalities attributable to motor vehicle 
accidents is in the millions. Number of Road Traffic Deaths, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/gho/road_safety/mortality/number_text/en/ (last visited Nov. 13, 
2018) (estimating worldwide auto accident deaths in 2013 to be roughly 1.25 million). 
 5. LAWRENCE BLINCOE ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED) 5 (May 
2015) (finding medical costs responsible for $23.4 billion of the total economic cost of 
motor vehicle crashes in 2010). 
 6. Id. (finding $77.4 billion in lost productivity as a result of motor vehicle crashes 
in 2010). 
 7. DANIEL SMITH, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF 
NHTSA PRIORITY PLAN FOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND FUEL ECONOMY, 2015 TO 2017 at 2 
(June 2015) (“In addition to the terrible personal toll, these crashes have a huge economic 
impact on our society with an estimated annual cost of $242 billion, which is an average 
of $784 for every person in the United States. These crashes also result in $594 billion 
in societal harm from loss of life and the pain and decreased quality of life due to 
injuries.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, Self-Driving Cars Could Save 300,000 Lives Per 
Decade in America, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2015/09/self-driving-cars-could-save-300000-lives-per-decade-in-
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so? Because humans are so bad at driving. When it comes to operating motor 
vehicles, people have bad judgment, slow reflexes, inadequate skills, and 
short attention spans. They drive too fast. They drive while intoxicated. They 
drive while sleepy. They drive while distracted. In fact, according to the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, roughly 94 percent of auto 
accidents today are attributable to “driver error.”9 Computers can do better. 
At least that is the hope: that machine-learning computer algorithms, in 
combination with state-of-the-art sensors and advanced robotics, will be 
better—much better—drivers than humans are.10 Whether this will in fact be 
true is still unproven, but is most likely to be true with respect to so-called 
fully driverless “Level 5” vehicles,11 which are those autonomous or 
connected vehicles that are capable of operating on any road and under any 
conditions that a human driver can handle but with no input from a human 
passenger other than the choice of destination.12 Level 5 vehicles, because 
they would not suffer from the problems that plague human decision making 
in the driving context, do hold the promise to be substantially safer than the 
fully or even partially human-driven alternative.13 
 
america/407956/ (“Researchers estimate that driverless cars could, by midcentury, 
reduce traffic fatalities by up to 90 percent.”). 
 9. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES 
INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY 2 (Mar. 
2018), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812506. Another 2 
percent of accidents are attributable to vehicle component failure, 2 percent to 
environmental conditions (such as slick roads), and 2 percent to “unknown.” Id. What 
precisely these statistics mean, however, is not entirely clear. Specifically, it is not 
obvious how NHTSA’s statistical categories (such as “vehicle component failure”) 
would relate to analogous legal concepts (such as “defective product”). 
 10. For an extended argument for why driverless cars are better drivers than humans, 
see, e.g., HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, DRIVERLESS: INTELLIGENT CARS AND THE 
ROAD AHEAD (MIT Press 2016). 
 11. See infra note 12. Level 5 vehicles are also sometimes called autonomous 
vehicles, though that use of the term ignores the distinction between connected vehicles 
and truly autonomous vehicles. This Article will larger ignore that distinction as well. 
 12. It is these Level 5 vehicles that hold the real promise for substantial accident-risk 
reduction. SAE INTERNATIONAL, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO 
DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES J3016 (2018), 
https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/j3016_201806 (explaining levels 0, no autonomous 
features, through level 5, where a computer is “operating the vehicle on-road anywhere 
that a typically skilled human driver can reasonably operate a conventional vehicle”). 
This is in large part because Level 5 vehicles do not have the “handoff problem,” which 
occurs at that moment (with levels 1 through 4) when control of the vehicle must be 
transferred from the algorithm to the human driver. Alex Davies, The Very Human 
Problem Blocking the Path to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/human-problem-blocking-path-self-driving-cars/ 
(discussing how existence of handoff problem led Google, in 2012, and other companies 
more recently, to commit to developing level 5 autonomy). 
 13. One can certainly imagine the possibility of driving algorithms going haywire or 
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As promising as a world of highways filled with computer-driven vehicles 
might be, from an accident-reduction perspective,14 such a high-tech world 
is still only a possibility. And even if it happens, it will not be for a number 
of years. There continue to be major technological hurdles, as well as 
potential consumer resistance to actually riding in a driverless vehicle.15 
Therefore, the introduction, spread, and eventual dominance of Level 5s will 
take some time.16 During that transition, most automobiles will continue to 
be driven mostly by humans. Indeed, even in the long run, when Level 5 
vehicles have been perfected and are available to the general public either 
through individual purchases and leases or through some ride-sharing 
arrangement (via Uber or Lyft or some similar web-based platform), we 
should still expect to see a substantial number of fully or partially human-
driven vehicles traveling alongside them.17 
If I am right about this picture of the automotive future, what should the 
role of auto tort law be, now and going forward? More specifically, if we 
conceive of auto tort law—including both automaker product liability and 
driver negligence liability (and the insurance that covers both types of 
liability)—as a system of ex post auto-crash deterrence, what would the 
optimal or efficient auto tort/insurance regime look like?18 Further, how 
 
sensors failing in ways that cause terrible accidents. But presumably, regulators will not 
permit Level 5s to be sold until they prove themselves in large numbers of test miles to 
be substantially safer than human drivers. Some commentators have suggested that 
regulators not approve Level 5s unless and until they are shown to be twice as safe as 
human drivers. Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort 
Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
1611, 1653 (2017). 
 14. If the advent of autonomous and connected vehicles means more vehicles on the 
road, it could be bad news for efforts to combat climate change and improve air quality. 
 15. American Drivers Grow More Afraid of Driverless Vehicles, INS. J. (May 22, 
2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/05/22/490014.htm 
(noting that 73% of American drivers report being too afraid to ride in a fully automated 
vehicle). 
 16. Many experts think consumers will not even be able to purchase fully 
autonomous vehicles for another decade. Justin Gerdes, Not So Fast. Fully Autonomous 
Vehicles are More than a Decade Away, Experts Say, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/fully-autonomous-vehicles-decade-
away-experts (reporting results of informal poll of 300 industry experts). 
 17. See, e.g., Background On: Self-Driving Cars and Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. 
(July 30, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-self-driving-cars-and-
insurance (“According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, it is anticipated that 
there will be 3.5 million self-driving vehicles on U.S. roads by 2025, and 4.5 million by 
2030. However, the institute cautioned that these vehicles would not be fully 
autonomous, but would operate autonomously under certain conditions.”). 
 18. For this Article, I assume that the primary role of auto tort law is efficient 
deterrence. That means, creating incentives that induce all relevant parties—drivers, 
automakers, even pedestrians—to take efficient or cost-justified steps to minimize the 
probability and severity of accidents. On this view, the goal is not necessarily zero 
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should such an optimally designed auto tort/insurance regime take into 
account the emergence of Level 5 vehicles? 
These questions are the subject of this Article. Specifically, this Article 
lays out the potential (at this point purely theoretical) deterrence benefits of 
replacing our current auto tort regime (including auto products liability law, 
driver-based negligence claims, and auto no-fault regimes) with a single, 
comprehensive automaker enterprise liability system.19 This new regime 
would apply not only to Level 5 vehicles, but to all automobiles made and 
sold to be driven on public roads.20 Because such a system would make 
automakers unconditionally responsible for the economic losses resulting 
from any crashes of their vehicles, it would in effect make automakers into 
auto insurers as well, although such a change will likely lead to some 
restructuring in how automobiles are insured and sold. Or so I will argue. 
My basic argument is that a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability 
regime may have previously unexplored, or at least forgotten, deterrence 
 
accidents, because the cost of accident avoidance eventually renders additional 
investments in accident prevention inefficient and socially undesirable. This is a standard 
type of normative analysis of accident law. It is, of course, not the only way to evaluate 
an accident law regime. For example, if the primary function of auto tort law were instead 
merely compensation for the harms caused by auto accidents, or were to achieve 
corrective justice (in the sense of reversing wrongfully caused harms), some system other 
than the one proposed in this Article might make more sense. 
 19. The term “enterprise liability” has long been used to stand for the idea that 
“business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting from products they 
introduce into society.” George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A 
Political History of The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
461, 463 (1985) (describing intellectual history of enterprise liability idea). See also 
Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict 
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2001) (“[E]nterprise liability expresses the 
maxim that those who profit from the imposition of risk should bear the costs of the 
accidents that are a price of their profits.”). The concept of enterprise liability was much 
discussed in the 1980s and 1990s among tort scholars. See, e.g., Priest, supra; James A. 
Henderson Jr. The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD L. REV. 659 (1982) 
(discussing line-drawing issues that arise in connection with adopting enterprise liability 
regimes); and Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and 
the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994) 
(applying enterprise liability concepts to medical system). I, together with my colleagues 
and friends Jon Hanson and Steve Croley, started writing about enterprise liability around 
this time. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance 
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 
(1990); and Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived 
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993). 
 20. For a more recent proposal to create a special auto-manufacturer responsibility 
regime, which has similarities to the one I am describing here, but that—critically—
would be limited to accidents involving fully automated vehicles, see Kenneth S. 
Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for 
Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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benefits.21 First, it could greatly simplify our existing auto tort regime by 
replacing all of automaker liability law (including product design defect 
claims) and driver liability law (as well as existing no-fault regime) with a 
single enterprise liability regime under which all auto-accident victims could 
seek recovery. Second, it could encourage automakers to design and 
manufacturer safer vehicles, whether that means safer human-driven 
vehicles (with automated features) or Level 5 vehicles. Third, it could 
incentivize automakers to provide better warnings and instructions with their 
vehicles, including better ways to deal with the “hand off” problem that 
occurs when vehicles switch from semi-self-driving mode to human-driven 
mode.22 Fourth, enterprise liability could result in automobile prices that 
better reflect the actual costs of driving, leading to more optimal levels of 
auto sales and miles driven. Fifth, enterprise liability could induce auto 
companies to coordinate (in a way they are not presently coordinating) with 
the one industry that has more information than the auto companies have 
about how the specific driving patterns of individual human drivers affect 
the risk of auto accidents: namely, the auto insurance industry. Finally, a 
comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime would provide an 
implicit subsidy for the development and deployment of driverless 
technology, but only to the extent that automakers actually expect such 
technology to reduce accident costs. All of these points will be developed 
below. 
The argument will proceed as follows. Part II evaluates existing auto tort 
law—including automaker liability law and driver liability law—from the 
perspective of optimal deterrence. Part III outlines one plausible version of 
a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime and summarizes the 
primary deterrence advantages of such a regime. Part IV briefly concludes 




 21. In an article published in 1985, Professor Howard Latin outlined an automaker 
enterprise liability proposal similar to the one I am describing in this Article. Howard A. 
Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 
(1985). That article, brought to my attention by Professor Stephen Sugarman, also makes 
a deterrence case for adopting an automaker enterprise liability regime, emphasizing 
some (though not all) of the same arguments I make here. See also Bryant Walker Smith, 
Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 584 (Markus Maurer, et 
al. eds., 2016), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-48847-8_27 
(exploring (very briefly) the idea of using auto enterprise liability as a means of 
encouraging automotive safety innovation). 
 22. Steven Ashley, Level 3 “Hand Off” is Challenging AI Researchers, SAE INT’L 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.sae.org/news/2017/01/sae-level-3-hand-off-is-challenging-
ai-researchers. 
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II. EVALUATING THE DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT AUTO 
TORT LAW 
Automaker Liability Law 
To understand the deterrence benefits of an auto enterprise liability 
regime, it is necessary first to understand the deterrence consequences of the 
current auto tort regime. To that end, this Part describes the current auto tort 
system—both automaker liability law and driver liability law—and, drawing 
on well-known insights from deterrence theory and economic analysis of 
liability rules, explores what the general deterrence consequences of that 
regime might be. This is an entirely theoretical discussion. The ultimate 
question—which auto tort regime comes closes to minimizing the costs of 
auto accidents—can of course only be answered with empirical research that 
is beyond the scope of this short paper. 
Current automaker liability law, like manufacturer liability law generally, 
is primarily a negligence-based regime, by which I mean the following: 
Under current law in most U.S. jurisdictions, individuals who suffer harm 
caused in an automobile crash can recover from the automaker in tort if they 
can prove that the harm resulted from negligence (or a lack of reasonable 
care) on the part of the automaker in designing or constructing the vehicle.23 
Alternatively, auto accident victims can invoke modern products liability 
doctrine and argue that a “defect” in the vehicle’s design, manufacturing 
process, or warnings caused the harm.24 This latter approach also typically 
requires some showing of automaker negligence. This is because, in the bulk 
of U.S. jurisdictions, important aspects of the product defect law are 
equivalent to negligence law.25 For this reason, auto products-liability, 
 
 23. See, e.g., Larsen v. GM, 391 F.2d 495, 504 (1968) (holding, among other things, 
that auto manufacturers have a duty to use reasonable care in design and construction of 
vehicles). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§1 & 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(setting forth general rules for liability resulting from product defects). 
 25. A majority of jurisdictions apply a risk-utility version of the design defect test, 
which is similar to the common cost-benefit formulations of negligence. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB., §2, cmt. D (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). Moreover, the adequacy 
of product warnings is often evaluated according to a negligence-based reasonableness 
test. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 
3 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). Also, in the jurisdictions that define design defect according 
to “reasonable consumer expectations,” there is an obvious reliance on negligence-based 
principles as well, such as the concept of reasonableness. Current products liability law 
with respect to warnings is also essentially a negligence-based regime. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB., §2, cmt. I (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). (“Commercial product 
sellers must provide reasonable instructions and warnings about risks of injury posed by 
products.”). 
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despite sometimes being labeled a form of “strict liability,”26 is in fact largely 
a form of negligence liability.27 
A negligence-based automaker liability regime can in theory have certain 
deterrence advantages, if one makes particular assumptions. Those 
assumptions, however, are keys to the analysis—and do not always apply. 
For starters, a negligence-based automaker liability regime can create 
efficient incentives with respect to automaker care levels. Automaker “care 
levels” are the precautions taken by automakers—in the design, production, 
and warnings with respect to their vehicles—that reduce the probability or 
severity of auto accidents.28 Efficient automaker care levels occur when the 
 
 26. For an example of lawyers characterizing auto products liability generally, 
including design defect and warning defect claims, as a form of “strict liability,” see, 
e.g., DEREK H. SWANSON & LIN WEI, MCGUIREWOODS, UNITED STATES AUTOMOTIVE 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 7 (2009), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-
resources/publications/us-automotive-products-liability.pdf. 
 27. I am of course not the first person to observe that modern “strict” products 
liability operates in practice largely as a negligence regime. See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 38 (3rd ed. 2015) (“These two propositions—that 
manufacturers must guard against risks only if they are foreseeable, and that 
manufacturers must guard against those risks only with precautions that are reasonable—
are the two major pillars of modern products liability law in America.”). This is not to 
say that there are no aspects of strict liability in the current auto products liability system. 
For example, manufacturing defect cases approximate true strict liability. That is, when 
the product’s design satisfies the risk-utility standard (or is, in a sense, reasonable or non-
negligent) but the particular product that caused the harm in the case did so as a result of 
some sort of malfunction in the vehicle that is not a result of negligent maintenance on 
the part of the vehicle owner (e.g., the brakes or the steering mechanism simply fails), 
the automaker is strictly liable. With respect to Level 5 vehicles, presumably a much 
higher percentage of the accidents would be a result of vehicular malfunction than is the 
case with human-drive vehicles; thus, there would be a much larger domain of true strict 
liability if existing product liability doctrine were applied to Level 5 accidents than is 
currently the case with automaker liability cases. Further, in design defect jurisdictions 
that apply a consumer expectations test, strict liability also seems likely, assuming courts 
conclude that consumers reasonably expect Level 5s not to crash. Still, there would be 
some negligence-based liability with respect to the design of the vehicles and the 
algorithm that drives them. See, e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and 
Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017) (noting that, applying existing law, 
automaker liability for Level 5 accidents will likely turn on some version of 
“unreasonable performance” by the vehicle, which sometimes will approximate strict 
liability and sometimes negligence); and Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous 
Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (observing that applying existing products liability law 
to Level 5s will sometimes result in strict liability and sometimes negligence-based 
liability). 
 28. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 73–85 
(1987) (comparing theoretical deterrence benefits of negligence liability rule and strict 
liability rule, in terms of care levels and activity levels); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54–84 (1987) (same); and A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 113–123 (3rd ed. 
2003) (discussing choice of optimal products liability rules in particular). 
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automaker has made all available investments in care—in crash-risk 
reduction—that reduce expected auto-accident costs by more than the 
marginal costs of the additional care.29 Thus, an efficient negligence-based 
tort liability rule would hold an automaker liable for the harms resulting from 
a given auto accident only if that automaker failed to take efficient care. For 
example, if there was an alternative automotive design or alternative warning 
that the automaker could have used that would have reduced expected 
accident costs by more than the marginal costs of that design or warning 
change, failing to deploy that alternative design or warning in their vehicles 
would constitute negligence on the part of the automaker, and would 
therefore be potential grounds for tort liability.30 
This sort of efficient negligence-based liability rule would induce 
automakers to take efficient care if we assume the following to be true: (a) 
that automakers are aware of the law and respond rationally to it, and (b) that 
courts applying a negligence-based automaker liability rules perform a 
thorough and accurate cost-benefit analysis (for example, judges and juries 
do not tend to make systematic errors in their determinations regarding what 
constitutes automaker negligence or what counts as a design defect). Under 
those assumptions, the negligence-based regime would incentivize efficient 
automaker care levels. Why? Because automakers would under those 
assumptions realize that they can avoid negligence-based liability entirely if 
they merely make all cost-justified investments in auto safety (e.g., all cost-
justified design and warning changes). Knowing this, they would have a 
strong legal and financial incentives to do just that.31 
In addition, a negligence-based automaker liability regime can also create 
incentives for efficient driver care-levels—incentives for drivers to drive 
reasonably carefully—even in the absence of a defense of contributory 
negligence or comparative fault.32 This is because a negligence-based 
regime, by its nature, leaves accident costs on victims and their insurers when 
the automaker is not negligent. That fact will induce drivers to drive 
carefully, so as to minimize their own risk of uncompensated accident losses. 
Again, however, this conclusion holds only if certain key assumptions are 
also true. Specifically, we must assume the following: a) that drivers, like 
automakers, are knowledgeable about tort law and respond rationally to the 
 
 29. Put differently, when an automaker is investing efficiently in care, there are no 
additional investments in accident reduction that could be made that would reduce 
expected accident costs by more than the costs of accident avoidance. 
 30. The plaintiff must also demonstrate causation. 
 31. This insight is simply an application of a standard conclusion regarding the 
effects on injurer care levels of a perfectly applied negligence rule. See generally supra 
sources cited in note 28. 
 32. See generally supra sources cited in note 28. 
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potential of tort rules to apply to their future conduct; and b) that drivers 
actually bear these costs and do not externalize them to someone else. 
To put all of this together, according to standard deterrence theory, an 
efficiently and accurately applied negligence-based automaker liability rule 
can produce efficient incentives for both automakers and drivers to take care 
to avoid auto accidents.33 
But there are obvious problems with this rosy picture. First, consider the 
effects on automaker care levels if we relax the assumption that courts 
accurately apply negligence-based standards. If judges and juries are not 
very good at doing the complex and information-intensive analysis necessary 
to determine what particular automotive designs, warnings, or instructions 
are cost-justified or reasonable (or not defective), the outcomes of courts’ 
negligence determinations become highly uncertain. This can in turn produce 
incentives for automakers both to over-invest and to under-invest in auto 
safety.34 
The incentive to over-invest in auto safety can arise when manufacturers 
expect courts to set the standard of reasonable care (or a non-defective 
design) inefficiently high—that is, when manufacturers expect that courts 
may find a design defect notwithstanding the fact that the automaker’s design 
decisions were consistent with an accurate, objective, comprehensive risk-
utility test. If that is the expectation, then automakers would have an 
incentive to satisfy the inefficiently high court- or jury-imposed design 
standard (or warning standard) in order to avoid liability. The incentive to 
under-invest in safety can arise if courts rely too much on custom within the 
industry as their source for what constitutes reasonable care, or a non-
defective design or warning. This is because industry custom can (famously) 
lag behind what is truly efficient levels of safety.35 It is not a surprise, then, 
that commentators have argued that custom-based standards of care, like 
those that currently apply to automaker liability, can inhibit innovation.36 
 
 33. See generally supra sources cited in note 28. This conclusion also assumes that 
automakers are well informed about and respond rationally to tort liability rules. 
 34. See generally Mark Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 
Yale L.J. 799 (1983); and John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty 
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 982 (1984). 
 35. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1937) (“a whole calling may have unduly 
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices”). In product liability design defect 
cases, of course, courts do not generally permit compliance with industry custom to be 
totally exculpatory; however, it can be considered relevant to the risk-utility negligence-
based balancing test. See, e.g., Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 
1983). However, if a defendant in a negligence-based product liability regime has 
adopted a design that is the safest in use at the time of manufacturing, it may be difficult 
for the plaintiff to prevail. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB., §2, cmt. D 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1998). 
 36. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Tort and Innovation, 107 Mich. 
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A second problem with a negligence-based auto products liability regime 
has to do with driver care levels. For a negligence-based regime to efficiently 
incentivize drivers to drive carefully (by imposing on drivers the risk of 
accidents that are not cost-justifiably preventable by the manufacturer), 
recall that we assumed that drivers are well informed of both accident risks 
and how those risks are allocated according to the specific rules of auto tort 
law. Those assumptions are obviously unrealistic. Drivers simply are not 
aware of the tort law rules that apply to them or the product liability rules 
that apply to automakers. Moreover, even when drivers do know about 
accident risks and legal rules, there are reasons to believe (discussed 
below)37 either that drivers will not respond rationally to that information or 
that they will externalize those risks to insurance companies. If I am right 
about that—about drivers’ lack of information about driving risk and auto 
tort law, and about their cognitive biases and cost-externalization—then the 
ability of a negligence-based auto products liability regime to optimize driver 
care levels is substantially undermined. Legally imposing costs on drivers 
would not, or at least may not, have the desired deterrence effect on driver 
care levels.38 
The final deterrence problem with a negligence-based auto products 
liability regime would exist even if judges and juries were good (accurate 
and unbiased) at applying risk-utility or cost-benefit standards. In fact, this 
problem results because automakers would expect accurate application of 
the negligence-based rules. The problem involves the effect of a negligence-
based automaker liability rule on the number of vehicles sold, or, in the 
language of deterrence, the effect on automaker “activity levels.”39 Even an 
efficiently safe car (one with no defects whatsoever) that is driven carefully 
by its human or algorithmic driver poses some residual or irreducible risk of 
crashing. This residual risk will have a tendency to be ignored or externalized 
by automakers under a negligence-based product liability regime because 
automakers can virtually insulate themselves against liability by merely 
 
L. Rev. 285 (2008). 
 37. See infra, discussion at notes 44–48 and 51. 
 38. By contrast, the assumption that automobile manufacturers—with their teams of 
expert engineers, lawyers, and accountants—are fully informed of the torts liability 
regime in which they operate and how those rules are likely to affect them. This claim—
that auto manufacturers are likely to be better informed (both about the risks of auto 
accidents and about the relevant liability rules) and more classically rational in their 
decision-making than drivers—is not new. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 21, at 692–93 
(arguing that, because drivers are much less likely to know about and respond rationally 
to having auto-accident losses imposed on them than auto manufacturers are, a regime 
of auto-manufacturer enterprise liability could produce an overall improvement in social 
welfare, through a reduction in overall auto accidents). 
 39. See supra sources cited in note 28. 
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complying with the liability standard.40 The result of this externality is that 
the scale of operation in the auto industry—the number of cars sold—may 
be higher than the social-welfare maximizing level, even ignoring the effect 
of automobile emissions on the environment, because the price of vehicles 
does not include this cost of unpreventable auto accidents. 
To summarize, given how our current negligence-based automaker 
liability regime is applied in practice, there are reasons to be concerned that 
automaker and driver care levels may be too low and activity levels too high. 
What’s more, this concern would apply not only to human-driven vehicles, 
but to Level 5 vehicles as well. That is, there is nothing about the nature of 
Level 5 vehicles that would suggest these problems are less likely to be 
present than would be the case for human-driven vehicles.41 This activity-
level inefficiency associated with current automaker liability law has been 
totally ignored by those who have argued in favor of applying existing 
product liability standards, or revised but still negligence-based versions of 
existing product liability standards, to Level 5 vehicles. 
Driver Liability Law 
In a majority of states in the U.S., if someone is injured or suffers property 
damage as a result of a driver’s negligent operation of an automobile, rather 
than as a result of automaker negligence, the victim may recover from the 
negligent driver under standard common-law principles of tort.42 The victim 
must demonstrate that the harm to her was a result of the driver’s failure to 
do something that a reasonable driver would have done under the 
circumstances, or the drivers’ doing something that a reasonable driver under 
the circumstances would not have done.43 Accident victims who can recover 
include pedestrians, cyclists, passengers, or other drivers—anyone who is 
 
 40. See supra sources cited in note 28. Of course, this automaker activity level effect 
is mitigated to some extent when automakers except to be held liable by courts despite 
having taken reasonable care. These effects are unlikely, however, to be perfectly 
offsetting. 
 41. With Level 5 vehicles, if there were a problem with “driver care levels,” it would 
be a problem automaker care levels. That is, with Level 5s, driver care levels are, by 
definition, included as a part of manufacturer care level. 
 42. For a summary of emergence of fault-based and no-fault auto liability/insurance 
systems, see JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON, SEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S. 
EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 19–61 
(2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG8 
60.pdf. 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (defining negligent conduct in terms 
of what reasonably prudent person would do or not do); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 3 cmt. h (Am. Law. Inst. 
1998) (“Many cases say that negligence consists of “the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, [or] the doing of something which a reasonably 
careful person would not do.”“) (citations omitted). 
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harmed as a result of driver negligence. 
Because driver liability is also a negligence-based regime, it has similar 
potential to provide efficient deterrence as does a negligence-based 
automaker liability regime. Specifically, negligence-based driver liability 
law can have beneficial deterrence effects on driver care levels, if we make 
the following assumptions: 
 
• Drivers are well informed about accident risks (and how their 
behavioral changes affect those accident risks), 
• Drivers are well-informed about the rules of tort law, 
• Drivers internalize those risks (do not externalize them to 
insurers, for example), and 
• Drivers process the information about those risks rationally 
(without any systematic cognitive biases), and we assume again 
that 
• Courts are good at applying cost-benefit-type negligence-based 
liability rules. 
 
If all of those assumptions are true, then, for the same reason that automakers 
would be incentivized by a negligence-based automaker liability regime, 
drivers too would be incentivized to drive with efficient care—in terms of 
driving speed, safe braking and passing practices, smart-phone usage (or 
non-usage), and the like. This is so because, by taking efficient care in 
driving, drivers would avoid liability for the accidents that nevertheless 
occur. Again, under a negligence-based regime, driving with efficient care 
can be seen as a type of insurance for drivers, a fact that—if all of the above-
listed assumptions are true—would incentivize safe driving. 
The reasons that this vision of negligence-based driver liability law do not 
describe reality should be clear at this point. The assumptions listed above 
on which the analysis depends almost certainly do not hold in the real world. 
While drivers may be generally aware of the broad outlines of the driver 
liability regime in their state (whether it is fault-based or no-fault), they 
likely do not understand what the precise implications of that fact are on their 
chances of being found liable in court for unsafe driving. What’s more, the 
average driver, while generally and vaguely cognizant of the risks of driving, 
is almost certainly uneducated about the precise levels of risk associated with 
various aspects of driving—for example, precisely how much the chance of 
a crash is increased by texting while driving or changing lanes abruptly with 
no signal. In fact, there is a good chance that most drivers underestimate 
those risks. 
Why would drivers tend to underestimate such risks? First, there is the 
long list of well-documented cognitive biases that affect how individuals 
14 JOURNAL OF LAW AND MOBILITY 2019 
process information generally.44 One famous example is the tendency of 
individuals to ignore the risk of very low probability events and 
underestimate the likelihood of some high probability events.45 Auto-crash 
risks may similarly be ignored or underestimated.46 Also, drivers are 
especially prone to overestimating their own driving ability and thus their 
own ability to avoid crashes.47 Moreover, drivers not only underestimate 
their own likelihood of a crash relative to the average driver (which they do), 
they also overestimate their own likelihood of a crash relative to the actual 
probability.48 For all of these reasons, a negligence-based driver liability 
 
 44. The sources here are many. A decent place to start would be the classic essay by 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). More recent summaries of the 
literature include DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); and RICHARD 
H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORIAL ECONOMICS (2015). A classic 
article summarizing the application of behavioral insights to law and economics is 
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
 45. For a summary of the relative behavioral literature as it relates to products 
liability, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: the 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 643–87 (1999). For early 
applications of behavioral insights to products liability law, see Latin, supra note 21; and 
Howard A. Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1194–95 (1994). For a discussion of the findings on very low 
probability and high probability events, see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 45, at 716–20. 
Note that there is also research showing that consumers sometimes overestimate the risks 
of merely “low probability” events—those that fall between very low probability and 
high probability. Id. (discussing research summarized in Enterprise Responsibility for 
Personal Injury, 1 A.L.I. 230 (1991)). 
 46. Whether auto risks are more likely to be very low, merely low, or high 
probability events is not entirely clear. However, the most important insight of the 
Hanson & Kysar article is that, because product manufacturers—including automakers-
-have considerable influence over how consumers perceive the risk of their products (and 
because product manufacturers—including automakers--have a strong market incentive 
to ensure that consumers underestimate the risks of their products), there is every 
likelihood that consumers on balance underestimate the risks of auto accidents. Id. 
Moreover, Hanson & Kysar, in a follow up article, provide considerable anecdotal 
evidence of actual market manipulation of consumer risk perceptions by manufacturers. 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of 
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1466 (1999). 
 47. This finding has proven robust over many years. See, e.g., Ola Svenson, Are We 
All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 
143 (1981); Timo Lajunen & Heikki Summala, Driving experience, personality, and skill 
and safety-motive dimensions in drivers’ self-assessments 19 PERSONALITY AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES. 307 (1995); A.F. Williams, Views of US drivers about driving 
safety 34 J. SAFETY RES. 491 (2003). See also Jolls et al., supra, at 1537–38 (discussing 
problem of “overoptimisim” among drivers); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 259, 354–
55 (1999) (same). 
 48. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
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regime, which relies on assumptions of informed and rational drivers to 
produce optimal driver care levels, may not produce the deterrence benefits 
that are predicted by deterrence theory.49 In addition, it is commonly argued 
that drivers have many powerful incentives to drive carefully even in the 
absence of a negligence-based regime that left on them the uninsured costs 
of auto accidents, incentives such as the desire to avoid a traffic fines or, 
more importantly, a crash that could be painful or even fatal to them or their 
loved ones.50 
How does this pessimistic picture of driver liability law as a system of 
incentivizing good driving change if we introduce auto insurance? The 
answer to that question turns out to be complicated. On one hand, automobile 
insurance has the potential to correct some of these deterrence-related 
problems.51 Here’s why. Auto insurers are, unlike most drivers, extremely 
well informed about the intricacies of accident law. They employ teams of 
lawyers whose job is to understand how driver liability laws in each state 
affect the liability risks of their customers. Indeed, their profitability and 
their survival as going concerns depend on this expert understanding of the 
auto liability laws of all sorts. In addition, auto insurers have unparalleled 
access to enormous amounts of detailed information regarding the crash-risk 
characteristics of millions of drivers and automobiles. This is the result of 
decades of experience providing auto insurance coverage to hundreds of 
millions of drivers and vehicles, which in turn means pricing millions of auto 
insurance policies and adjusting millions of auto-crash claims over the years. 
No other institution or organization would have the same amount of driver-
specific, automobile-specific data, as would the auto insurance industry. 
In addition, recent innovations in “telematics” (which combines 
 
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1660 (citing Richard J. Arnould & Henry Grabowski, Auto Safety 
Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure, 12 BELL J. ECON. 27, 34–35 (1981) and Colin 
F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: 
Policy Implications, 8 J. POLY. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 566 (1989)). 
 49. The evidence on whether negligence-based driver liability law reduces auto 
accidents, or the harms resulting from auto accidents, is probably best characterized as 
inconclusive. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation of No-
Fault’s Demise, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 332–333 (2012) (“[R]oughly half of the studies 
published thus far claim that no-fault coverage increases fatal accidents, while the other 
half find no effect, and the notion that no-fault reduces fatalities has been seemingly put 
to rest.”) (footnotes omitted). The hope that a shift away from a negligence-based driver-
liability regime would not substantially reduce auto accidents, along with the overall 
desire to lower auto insurance rates, was one of the original justifications for the 
movement towards auto no-fault regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. 
 50. Latin, supra note 21, at 690–91; Engstrom, supra note 49, at 330. 
 51. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012) (discussing ways that 
insurance companies help insureds reduce risk). 
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telecommunications, data science, and automotive technology) have 
increased auto insurers’ ability to gather and analyze risk-relevant driver and 
vehicle data.52 With this new and emerging technology, not only do insurers 
have access to information regarding how drivers’ past auto-claims and 
traffic-ticket histories affect their riskiness as drivers; they also have the 
ability to gather information on the effects of a range of specific driving 
behaviors on auto-crash risks.53 For example, a number of insurers currently 
gather information about drivers’ braking, acceleration, speeding, turning, 
and cornering behaviors and then send that information back to the insurers 
for analysis.54 Once this driver-specific data is combined with data gather by 
insurers and others (including NHTSA) about what factors cause auto 
accidents generally, it becomes possible for auto insurers to link specific 
driving behaviors of particular drivers with premium discounts.55 
All of this information is to varying degrees already being taken into 
account by many auto insurance companies in the pricing of their insurance 
policies. For example, policy discounts are offered to drivers with good 
safety records56 as well as for vehicles with particular safety features.57 In 
addition, insurers are now offering discounts if drivers will improve their 
driving ability—for example, if they will take defensive driving classes.58 
Because of telematics revolution, auto insurers are even able to adjust 
premiums on the basis of the specific driving behavior of individual drivers. 
For example, some insurers give discounts for a range of driver-care-level 
factors such as wearing seatbelts, driving at moderate speeds, limiting late 
 
 52. Background On: Pay-As-You-Drive Auto Insurance (Telematics), INS. INFO. 
INST., https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-pay-as-you-drive-auto-insurance-tele 
matics (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
 53. Id. See also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 51. 
 54. Yuanjing Yao, Evolution of Insurance: A Telematics-Based Personal Auto 
Insurance Study, U. CONN. HONORS SCHOLAR THESES, 590, 598 (2018), 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses/590/. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Most auto insurers give discounts for being accident free for a given period of 
time. Car Insurance Discounts, VALUEPENGUIN, https://www.valuepenguin.com/car-
insurance-discounts (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). See also Yao, supra note 54 (discussing 
use of behavioral driving discounts among insurers). 
 57. One survey of the leading car insurers, found the following additional vehicle-
safety-related discounts: passive restraint (25% to 30%), new car (10%), daytime running 
lights (around 3%). Id. Some insurers are starting to offer discounts for semi-autonomous 
features such as adaptive cruise control, collision avoidance systems, and lane departure 
warnings. Cherise Threewitt, What Car Insurance Discounts Can I Get?, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (June 29, 2018), https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/car-insurance/car-
insurance-discounts. 
 58. Car Insurance Discounts, supra note 56 (reporting insurers giving discounts of 
10% to 15% for completion of defensive driving courses). 
DETERRENCE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE AUTOMAKER 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY  17 
night trips, and avoiding aggressive braking.59 Also, the advances in 
telematics have made “pay as you go” auto insurance, under which premiums 
are a function of the number of miles driven, more accurate—and thus more 
prevalent—than ever before.60 Driving-behavior-sensitive auto insurance 
premiums—which could take into account both good and bad driving 
choices (i.e., driver care levels) and, critically, the number of miles driven 
(i.e., driver activity levels)—hold the promise of incentivizing risk-reducing 
driving behavior in a way that even the most sophisticated government 
regulator could not hope to do.61 
But here is the problem: Under current law and given existing market 
conditions, auto insurers do not have strong incentives to make full use of 
their comparative advantage at gathering risk-relevant information and 
pricing their insurance on the basis of that information, or at least there is 
reason to be concerned about their incentives to do so. The reason for 
concern is that the amount of coverage currently being provided by auto 
insurers presently represents only a fraction (in many cases a small fraction) 
of the total risks of auto crashes. This is true of first-party auto insurance 
coverage, which tends to cover only a fraction of the accident risks that any 
driver faces.62 It is also true of auto liability coverage, owing in part to the 
 
 59. Id. See also Barbara Marquand, Comparing Drivewise, Snapshot and Other 
Usage-Based Insurance Plans, NERDWALLET (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www. 
nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/comparing-drivewise-snapshot-usage-based-insurance/. 
 60. Usage-Based Insurance and Telematics, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS 
(July 26, 2018), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.htm. 
 61. See generally Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 51 (discussing potential risk 
reducing benefits of high-tech auto-insurance pricing); Hanson & Logue, supra note 19, 
at 192–93 (suggesting reasons why auto insurance is better at risk-segregating than other 
types of first-party insurance). What little empirical research has been done on the subject 
tends to confirm that incentive-based insurance pricing tends to alter driving behavior in 
a risk-reducing direction. See Mark Stevenson et al., The effects of feedback and 
incentive-based insurance on driving behaviours: study approach and protocols, 24 INJ. 
PREVENTION, 89, 93 n. 27–30 (2018), https://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/24/1/89; 
see also Telematics Helps Reduce collisions and Claims, AUTOMOTIVE FLEET (Nov. 10, 
2017), https://www.automotive-fleet.com/157806/telematics-helps-reduce-collisions-
and-claims. 
  62. This assertion requires some explanation. There are no good studies on this 
particular question. So my claim is derived from circumstantial evidence of a sort. First, 
note that, whereas all states require some amount of liability insurance coverage for 
anyone who drives on public roadways, only a small minority of states require drivers to 
purchase auto insurance that provides any sort of first-party medical or disability 
benefits. See, e.g., Background on: Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. 
INST. (April 16, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-compulsory-auto-
uninsured-motorists. What’s more, even when there is mandated medical or disability 
coverage, the amount of required coverage is almost always far less than would 
potentially be recoverable under an auto tort claim, whether it be an automaker liability 
claim or a driver liability claim, and far less than the potentially enormous total costs (in 
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fact that the mandatory minimum amounts in most states are far less than the 
maximum harm threatened by an auto accident that results in even one 
serious injury or death.63 As a result, many of the costs of auto accidents are 
currently being externalized to non-auto first-party health and disability 
insurers who—unlike auto insurers in the telematics age—do not tailor 
premiums at all based on their insureds’ driving decisions.64 Moreover, to 
the extent auto insurers do attempt to charge individualized, behaviorally- 
and risk-adjusted auto insurance rates (which, as I noted above, they are 
increasingly trying to do), this incentive is undermined by the fact that auto 
insurers cover only a fraction of the risks of auto accidents.65 
 
the millions) of any given auto accident. Id. (for example, noting mandatory amounts of 
bodily injury liability coverage ranging from $15,000 to $50,000 per person). Karl 
Eisenhower, Personal Injury Protection: How PIP Insurance Works in Your State, 
WALLET HUB (Jan. 9, 2015), https://wallethub.com/edu/pip-insurance/9248/ (noting PIP 
mandates ranging from $2000 per person in Utah to $50,000 in New York.) The only 
state that requires unlimited PIP coverage is Michigan. Id. Further, even when drivers do 
purchase first-party medical or disability coverage through their auto-insurance policy, 
that coverage is often secondary to the victims’ other forms of first-party health or 
disability insurance. For example, in some states requiring PIP coverage in auto policies, 
the insured can elect to make auto PIP coverage secondary to other first-party health and 
disability insurance. This is sometimes called the “coordination” option. MICH. DEPART. 
INS. & FIN. SERV., YOUR GUIDE TO AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: FOR MICHIGAN 
CONSUMERS 10 (Sept. 2017), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
difs/Auto_Insurance_Guide_448003_7.pdf. Because making auto health insurance 
secondary lowers the insured’s auto insurance premiums, and has little or no effect on 
her first-party health and disability insurance premiums, most insureds choose the 
coordination option, which means most insureds choose to make their non-auto first-
party insurers primary. In sum, most auto health and disability risks end up being borne 
by non-auto first-party insurers—such as health insurers and disability insurers. 
 63. State mandated minimums for liability coverage for personal injuries to a single 
person range from a low of $10,000 (Florida) to a high of $50,000 (Alaska and Maine), 
and by for the most common minimum is $25,000. Car Insurance Laws by State, 
FINDLAW, https://injury.findlaw.com/car-accidents/car-insurance-laws-by-state.html 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (gathering links to state laws). A single accident resulting in 
serious bodily injury or death could easily produce economic losses alone in excess of 
$1 million. 
 64. Most first-party health and disability insurers make no effort to price their 
coverage in a way that reflects the riskiness of insureds’ driving choices—such as how 
they drive, how much they drive, or even what type of vehicle they drive. See generally 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 19 (using fact that most non-auto first-party insurers do not 
price-differentiate on basis of consumer product use to argue for enterprise liability for 
product accident risks). There is a perfectly sensible reason for this fact: the risks of auto-
related health or disability claims are only a small fraction of the overall health and 
disability risks covered by any given first-party health or disability insurer. It is not worth 
the insurers’ while to tailor their insurance premiums on the basis of any particular 
behavioral choice of their insureds, other than perhaps the choice to smoke or not. The 
result of all this: that portion of auto crash risks that are ultimately born by non-auto first-
party insurers get externalized (or largely ignored) by drivers, with obvious deterrence 
consequences. 
 65. Because auto insurers do not bear all of the risks of auto accidents, the premium 
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It should also be noted, however, that there are important ways in which 
the allocation of auto-accident risks to non-auto first-party insurers has cost-
reducing advantages. This may seem incongruous with the argument in the 
previous paragraph, but it is not: While auto insurers are in a good position, 
through premium discounts, to help optimize driver care and activity levels, 
auto insurers are not necessarily in a good position to minimize some other 
costs associated with providing insurance benefits. For example, primary 
health care coverage provided through auto insurance companies is almost 
certainly much more expensive than primary health care provided through 
regular non-auto first-party health insurers. This would be because, although 
auto insurers, in a sense, specialize increasingly in reducing driver ex ante 
moral hazard, it is non-auto health insurance companies who specialize in 
reducing ex post medical moral hazard—that is, excessive or wasteful use of 
the healthcare system.66 My point here is only that the current division of 
auto-accident costs, allocating so little to auto insurers, may be non-optimal, 
given auto insurers potential ability to incentivize better (and less) driving.67 
To summarize, because of drivers’ lack of accident-risk information and 
understanding of auto tort law and their susceptibility to cognitive biases, 
 
discounts they are willing to offer to induce safer driving habits may not be adequate. 
The point can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose there was some investment 
in driver care that cost $50 but would reduce expected accident costs by $80. Say it would 
reduce a chance of a $200,000 loss from .001 to .0006. If the auto insurer bore the full 
$200,000 risk, it would have an incentive to offer a premium discount to cover the cost 
of driver care, with an additional discount perhaps up to a total just short of the $80 saved 
by the additional investment in driver care. But what if the auto-insurer bore only, say, 
$40,000 of the $200,000 potential loss? Then the largest discount it could offer without 
losing money would be $16, which would be the amount of the savings in going from a 
.001 to a .0006 risk of, now, $40,000 in covered losses. But that discount would not be 
enough to induce the consumer to make the investment in care, assuming the other 
$160,000 in expected accident cost is externalized either because of drivers’ under-
estimation of risk or because of non-adjusting non-auto first-party insurance coverage. 
 66. The claim that first-party health insurers specialize in trying to hold down health 
care costs may seem controversial, at least for fee-for-service policies. My claim is only 
that health insurers—especially ones that use managed care tools—are probably better 
at holding down ex post health care costs than are auto insurers. This is one of the reasons 
that auto no-fault regimes which make auto PIP coverage primary over non-auto first-
party health coverage are so expensive, and why auto-no-fault regimes have not led to 
the cost savings that were expected. See Engstrom supra note 49. Professor Engstrom 
notes that “[m]edical insurers . . . reduce costs via discounts and fee schedules, and the 
limit patient treatment using any number of mechanism, including deductibles, co-
payments, utilization controls, and medical protocols . . . , [a]uto insurers . . . tend to pay 
almost any bills that a victim incurs . . . dramatically increasing . . . the cost of care. Id. 
at 341 (citations omitted). 
 67. In Part III below, I suggest that, by adopting an automaker enterprise liability 
regime, automakers will have an incentive to strike the efficient balance between amount 
of auto-crash costs allocated to auto insurers and amount allocated to non-auto insurers. 
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and because of the presence of cost-externalizing insurance coverage, there 
is reason to be doubtful that the current negligence-based auto tort laws—
automaker liability laws as well as driver liability laws—work to optimize 
driver care and activity levels. As discussed in the next Part, the adoption of 
an auto enterprise liability regime could in theory create incentives for 
automakers, together with auto insurers, to provide better driver-side 
incentives, as well as better automaker safety incentives. 
III. THE AUTOMAKER ENTERPRISE LIABILITY ALTERNATIVE68 
The Basic Proposal 
As an alternative to our current negligence-based auto tort regime, 
consider the possibility of a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability 
regime. Under such a regime, anyone who suffers a physical injury or 
property damage in an automobile accident—whether driver, passenger, or 
pedestrian—would be legally entitled to recover, from the manufacturer of 
the vehicle involved, compensation for the losses sustained as result of the 
accident.69 Thus, to recover under this enterprise liability regime, accident 
victims would not be required to show negligence on the part of 
manufacturer or anyone else. Nor would accident victims have to prove that 
the automobiles, or any of the warnings or instructions accompanying the 
automobiles, are in anyway defective or unreasonably dangerous. Rather, 
crash victims would need only to prove that the harms for which they seek 
compensation “arose out of the use of” a vehicle that was designed and built 
by the manufacturer from whom compensation is sought. Each automaker, 
therefore, would be financially responsible for the losses resulting from any 
crash arising out of the use of that automaker’s vehicles.70 
 
 68. The arguments in this section draw on prior work done by me and a number of 
other scholars on the deterrence benefits of enterprise liability in various contexts. See, 
e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 19; Steve P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the 
Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); 
Kyle D. Logue & Jon D. Hanson, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998); and Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1420, 1553 (1999). In addition, as mentioned in an earlier 
footnote, the argument here has some overlap with a proposal made by Howard Latin. 
See generally Latin, supra note 21 (making a deterrence case of automaker enterprise 
liability). 
 69. This could be done through the existing court system or through specialized 
courts or agencies set up to handle auto-crash disputes. 
 70. The “arising out of the use of” analysis would replace a causation determination. 
This phrase is used now in standard auto insurance policies. Thus, an automaker 
enterprise liability regime would be a particular type of cause-based no-fault 
compensation regime, modeled after similar programs that have been adopted outside of 
the auto context, such as workers’ compensation laws at the state level or the vaccine 
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That is the most basic picture of the proposal. Now consider a few possible 
details of such a program. One important initial question is who exactly 
would fall within the class of “automakers” to whom the enterprise liability 
regime would apply. The most obvious class of defendants/payers would be 
the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of the vehicles involved in the 
crash. They are the ones who generally make the key automotive design 
choices, have control over the manufacturing processes, and decide on the 
terms of any warning or instruction manual; and they are also the ones with 
the greatest expertise on such questions. Auto manufacturers also determine 
the pricing of their vehicles and the number of them to produce, subject of 
course to the constraints of supply and demand. Given that manufacturer care 
levels and activity levels are key auto-accident deterrence variables, making 
OEMs responsible for the auto-crash costs associated with their vehicles has 
obvious deterrence benefits, discussed further below. 
Liability under an enterprise liability regime, however, would not 
necessarily be limited to auto manufacturers. Liability could also be 
extended, on a joint and several basis (or on a several basis), to a range of 
other enterprises that fall within the design, production, sale, and distribution 
chain of any given vehicle.71 In most cases, it is likely that the crash victim 
would bring the claim against the manufacturer, and then the manufacturer 
would either implead the other parties in the chain of production into that 
suit or would sue them separately in a contribution action. Precisely how the 
responsibility for the costs of any accident would be allocated among the 
various parties on the automaker side of the ledger is beyond the scope of 
this Article. That allocation of responsibility, however, would presumably 
 
compensation program at the federal level. See generally Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue 
& Michael S. Zamore, Smokers’ Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal 
Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. L.J. 519 (1998) (discussing deterrence 
benefits of cause-based no-fault compensation regimes). In the Workers’ Compensation 
context, claims against employers are limited to injuries or illness that “arise out of the 
course of employment.” Professors Abraham and Rabin have proposed a similar 
regime—that would also use the “arising out of” standard—but that would apply 
exclusively to accidents involving Level 5 automated vehicles. Rabin & Abraham, supra 
note 20. My idea is to make such a regime comprehensive, to apply to all motor vehicles, 
subject to transition rules discussed below. Some scholars have expressed concern about 
the use of enterprise liability regimes that rely on boundary-maintaining doctrines such 
as the “arising out of” concept used in workers’ compensation regimes, among other 
places. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 19. This is of course a reasonable concern, 
although the evidence suggests that programs such as workers’ compensation have found 
relatively effective ways to police the borders of their programs. DON DEWEES, DAVID 
DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING 
THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 393-394 (1996) (reporting administrative costs for workers’ 
compensation regimes that are low relative to those of the tort system). 
 71. Thus the concept of “automaker” in an automaker enterprise liability regime 
could be similar to the concept of a “seller” in existing products liability law. 
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be determined mostly by contracts among the counter-parties, which 
contracts should be enforced so long as the cost of auto accidents is not 
allocated to parties who are insolvent or judgment proof, which if permitted 
would undermine the deterrence benefits of the regime.72 
The types and amount of compensation recoverable under an automaker 
enterprise liability regime would probably be limited to economic losses—
medical expenses, lost income, and property damage. There is of course a 
deterrence argument for including noneconomic or pain-and-suffering 
damages as well, since failing to include noneconomic damages could 
produce a serious externality.73 However, some have argued that individuals 
do not desire to purchase insurance against non-economic losses (as 
evidenced by the dearth of pain-and-suffering insurance observed in the 
marketplace), and therefore should not be forced to purchase such coverage 
through a mandatory compensation regime.74 In any event, limiting 
compensation to economic losses, and thus not providing compensation for 
noneconomic harms, is a common and reasonable political compromise that 
is often made when no-fault cause-based compensation regimes are 
adopted.75 
It is worth emphasizing again that the compensation regime I am 
imagining is a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime. In other 
words, it would apply to all automobiles (sold after the effective date of the 
enacting legislation), whether driven by humans, computer algorithms, or 
any combination of the two. Thus, unlike some other proposals for 
manufacturer-funded vehicle compensation regimes, my proposal would not 
 
 72. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 
45 (1986) (explaining how presence of insolvent defendants undermines incentive effects 
of liability law). 
 73. Noneconomic damages are generally not covered by first-party insurance 
policies, which means, insofar as drivers (and consumers generally), because of the 
cognitive biases already discussed, ignore or underestimate the risks of auto accidents, 
they will externalize noneconomic damages as well. Including noneconomic damages, 
therefore, has the potential to improve care levels and activity levels. See Hanson & 
Logue, supra note 19, at 186–89 (describing the “unambiguous deterrence benefits of 
nonpecuniary-loss damages”). 
 74. Examples of this sort of argument can be found in George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546–47; and Alan 
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE 
L.J. 353, 362–67 (1988). For a powerful set of counter arguments, providing arguments 
why consumers might—and evidence that they in fact do—demand insurance for 
noneconomic losses, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of 
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995). 
 75. See generally Hanson, Logue & Zamore, supra note 66, at 556–62 (reviewing 
arguments for limiting damages in no-fault cause based compensation regimes to 
economic damages). 
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apply exclusively to Level 5 vehicles.76 Which is not to say that the regime 
would not have special rules for autonomous and connected vehicles. For 
example, whereas Level 5s may be in fewer accidents, or fewer accidents 
involving serious physical injuries or deaths (that’s the hope anyway), Level 
5 vehicle accidents may involve much higher auto-repair costs than accidents 
involving human-driven vehicles, because of the expense of repairing high-
tech sensors as well as computer hardware and software.77 
If an automaker enterprise liability regime were adopted, there would be 
no need for either the existing automaker liability laws (i.e., products liability 
as applied to automobiles), driver liability laws, or state auto no-fault laws. 
All of those auto tort regimes would be replaced by a single comprehensive 
automaker enterprise liability regime.78 Further, if a motor-vehicle crash 
were to involve two or more vehicles made by different auto manufacturers, 
the enterprise liability regime would handle the accident as follows: First, 
the victims would simply file claims for their covered economic losses, 
naming the automakers of all of the vehicles involved in the accident. After 
a factual determination was made of whether in fact all of the named vehicles 
contributed in some way to the accident, the victims’ crash costs would be 
split between or among the automakers (or the auto insurers covering the 
losses for each automaker). The split among the automakers could either be 
equal (each vehicle manufacturer bearing its pro rata share of the crash costs) 
or according to any other reasonable allocation formula that the industry 
agrees upon.79 
 
 76. For an interesting proposal to create a special enterprise liability-type regime, 
similar to the one I am describing, but that would be limited to accidents involving 
automated vehicles, see Abraham & Rabin, supra note 20. 
 77. Because of the higher repair costs, some in the auto insurance industry have 
proposed mandatory minimum auto repair coverage for self-driving vehicles. 
TRAVELERS INSTITUTE, INSURING AUTONOMY: HOW AUTO INSURANCE CAN ADAPT TO 
CHANGING RISKS 11 (2018), https://www.travelers.com/iw-documents/travelers-
institute/Final-Digital-2018-0710-AV-White-Paper-No-SAE.pdf. Under enterprise 
liability, of course, there would indeed be mandatory minimum auto repair coverage, as 
well as mandatory minimum personal injury coverage, but the coverage mandate would 
be imposed on automakers instead of auto purchasers. 
 78. Tort liability for non-economic and potentially punitive damages could be 
retained for especially egregious behavior, such as recklessness or intentionally harmful 
actions, on the part of defendants. 
 79. The deterrence benefit for automaker and driver care and activity levels would 
largely remain, without the need for individualized fault determinations in multi-vehicle 
crashes. The crash data gathered from all the payouts under the program would provide 
information as to which types of vehicles and which drivers tended to be in accidents, 
how much damage resulted from those accidents, and under what circumstances. This 
information would be combined with the data gathered by automakers and auto insurers 
regarding individual vehicle and driver behavior in contexts not involving accidents. 
There would be little additional deterrence benefit to investing in the costly judicial 
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One result of the adoption of a comprehensive automaker enterprise 
liability regime would be an increase in the apparent (and the experienced or 
internalized) price of most newly purchased automobiles, relative to vehicles 
purchased before the effective date of the enacting legislation.80 This would 
happen because the cost of auto accidents that had been hidden in non-auto 
first-party insurance coverage prior to the enterprise liability regime would, 
with the adoption of the new system, be brought into the open through 
increases in automobile and auto-insurance prices. Because such a shift 
would be a significant change in the automotive marketplace, it would 
probably be prudent (and politically necessary) to institute a delayed 
effective date and/or an extended phase-in period over which the law would 
take effect.81 
The Theoretical Deterrence Benefits 
Under a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime, because 
automakers would be responsible for all of the economic costs of auto 
accidents associated with their vehicles, they would be forced to internalize 
those costs. As a result, there would be beneficial deterrence consequences 
for automaker, and potentially driver, care and activity levels. This section 
explores those consequences. 
First, automakers would have a strong legal and financial incentive to 
develop and implement cost-justified auto-safety innovations, whatever 
those might be. That is, if an automaker determined that there was some new 
brake design (such as a new computer-assisted automatic braking system) or 
some new guided cruise control mechanism that would reduce overall 
accident costs relative to its costs of development and implementation, then 
enterprise liability would reward them implementing those innovations, and 
 
determination of which driver, if any, was at fault or which vehicle, if any, was defective. 
 80. This assumes that the new law would have a grandfather provision exempting 
vehicles built and sold before new law’s effective date. As discussed in the conclusion, 
such complete grandfathering is not the only conceivable approach to handling the 
transition to the new regime. 
 81. If there is indeed deterrence value to shifting these costs from non-auto first-
party insurers to automakers, as argued in the next section, then the overall price of 
vehicles (including the costs covered by various forms of first-party non-auto-specific 
insurance) should eventually go down, especially if the pace of the transition to driverless 
technology is hastened. Indeed, a significant result of adopting a comprehensive 
automaker enterprise liability regime is that Level 5 vehicles, if they provide as big an 
advance in safety as many are expecting, would be substantially less expensive overall 
than conventional human-driven vehicles. Cf. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving 
and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing the potentially 
massive reduction in overall vehicle prices resulting from the shift to automated vehicles 
under existing product liability law). A bigger concern with the price increase is the effect 
on low-income drivers. I address this concern briefly in Part IV below, though the cost 
of mobility generally is a topic worthy of special consideration. 
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punish them for not doing so. What’s more, there would be no inefficient 
incentive to stick with existing industry customs or consumer expectations if 
such customs or expectations were lagging behind proven safety 
innovations. Likewise, there would be no incentive to over-invest in safety 
features that are likely to impress a court or jury in a negligence-based 
lawsuit (such as a design defect lawsuit) but that, in actuality, provide less 
additional accident-risk reduction than they cost to produce.82 
Second, enterprise liability would force the price of automobiles to reflect 
the full-expected costs of auto accidents. That cost-internalization, in turn, 
could result in a scale of automotive manufacturing and sales that would be 
closer to the social optimum than is currently the case, as drivers would—in 
deciding whether to purchase a vehicle—be more likely to take into account 
something closer to the full social costs of that decision. In other words, auto 
enterprise liability could push us in the direction of optimal manufacturer 
activity levels: the optimal number of vehicles being sold. If that were to 
happen, it would be a clear improvement—in terms of overall efficiency—
over the existing negligence-based automaker liability regime. 
It is worth pausing here to emphasize the potential effects of a 
comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime on the development of 
and transition to Level 5 vehicles. Because it to would be a comprehensive 
regime, it would apply to both driverless and human-driven vehicles. 
Assuming automakers expect Level 5s to bring a dramatic reduction in 
expected accident costs relative to human-driven vehicles, then Level 5s, 
when they eventually are available for sale to consumers, would have a 
substantially lower enterprise liability “tax” relative to human-driven 
vehicles made and produced after the new regime is adopted, since the 
human-drive vehicles would have much higher expected accident costs.83 As 
 
 82. Obviously, automakers already have some incentives to develop such safety 
technology, in part because of consumer tastes for safer vehicles and perhaps because of 
the threat of potential liability under existing tort law. See, e.g., Press Release, NHTSA, 
NHTSA-IIHS Announcement on AEB, (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-
releases/nhtsa-iihs-announcement-aeb (“Twenty automakers pledged to voluntarily 
equip virtually all new passenger vehicles by September 1, 2022, with a low-speed AEB 
system that includes forward collision warning technology proven to help prevent and 
mitigate front-to-rear crashes.”). Consistent with this fact, it is common knowledge that 
safety innovation has been happening for decades without the presence of an automaker 
enterprise liability regime. My argument is that, according to a nuanced application of 
standard deterrence theory, safety-enhancing automotive innovations would be more 
likely to be adopted and would be adopted more quickly under an automaker enterprise 
liability regime. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 21, at 691 (making similar argument with 
respect to airbags, suggesting that adoption of automaker enterprise liability would have 
hastened the industry’s move to include airbags). 
 83. For now, I am assuming that “old” vehicles, produced before the enactment of 
the new regime, would be totally grandfathered and thus exempt from the new law. I 
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a result, there would be a natural enterprise liability subsidy in favor of the 
production of Level 5 vehicles; and this subsidy, in effect, would be funded 
by a relatively high enterprise liability tax on human-driven vehicles, again, 
assuming such vehicles are not nearly as safe as Level 5s. Thus, the adoption 
of a comprehensive automaker liability regime would, under present 
assumptions, strongly incentivize and reward auto manufacturers to proceed, 
as quickly as is feasible, with the development and distribution of Level 5 
vehicles. By contrast, if a special liability regime were adopted just for Level 
5s, that increased their potential accident liability relative to human-driven 
vehicles, there would be a disincentive to move to Level 5s in the absence of 
a separate subsidy regime, perhaps funded by federal income taxes.84 
There are efficiency reasons to prefer a Level 5 vehicle subsidy that is 
funded through an enterprise liability tax on auto sales, with the amount of 
the cross-subsidy depending on the relative risk of vehicles (and drivers), 
over a subsidy funded by federal income taxes. The main advantage has to 
do with information. Under the direct subsidy, the regulator—or whatever 
government body would be asked to determine the amount and structure of 
the subsidy—would have to determine which particular safety technologies 
to subsidize and which not to subsidize and how much the subsidy should 
be. This would require an enormous amount of information and expertise 
that is not within the government’s comparative advantage relative to the 
auto industry. By contrast, under the subsidy structure inherent in a 
comprehensive enterprise liability regime, it is the auto industry who would 
calculate the appropriate amount of the subsidy ex ante, based on their 
educated guesses about (a) the amount of costs to be imposed on them under 
the regime for accidents involving human-driven vehicles, (b) the amount of 
costs that would be imposed on them if they make the investment necessary 
to develop and implement Level 5 vehicles, and (c) the R&D, design, 
manufacturing, marketing, training, and other costs that would be necessary 
to get Level 5s fully up and running.85 
If an enterprise liability regime is likely to have deterrence benefits on the 
 
return to this assumption in the conclusion. 
 84. Abraham and Rabin make such a proposal, including the need for a subsidy for 
Level 5 vehicles. Abraham & Rabin, supra note 20, at 45. 
 85. It is at least possible that the expected accident costs associated with Level 5 
vehicles will not be, overall, a lot less than that of human-driven vehicles, once the cost 
of repairing the vehicles is taken into account. That is, while Level 5s are expected to 
reduce frequency collisions and the number of auto-related deaths and serious bodily 
injuries, they may result in increased repair costs, due to the expense of repairing or 
replacing the damaged technology in a Level 5 vehicle. In that sense, we might be trading 
one sort of cost for another, which of course can be socially desirable. This fact, however, 
might counsel in favor of including at least some noneconomic (or pain-and-suffering) 
damages in the enterprise liability regime, to make sure that such costs get included in 
the enterprise liability subsidy for Level 5 vehicles. 
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automaker side, what about its deterrence effects on driver behavior? How 
an auto-enterprise liability regime would affect the driving behavior of 
human drivers is of course an especially important question, given that, with 
non-Level 5 vehicles, human drivers make most of the important operational 
decisions. In fact, enterprise liability could actually help with driver care and 
activity levels in a number of ways. First, enterprise liability would create 
strong legal and financial incentives for automakers to develop and adopt the 
most cost-effective ways of warning drivers about crash risks and of 
instructing drivers about how best to avoid certain types of accidents.86 This 
effect flows from the fact that enterprise liability makes automakers’ 
responsible for all the economic costs of their vehicles’ accidents: If an 
automaker could actually reduce the frequency or severity of accidents in its 
vehicles by altering the wording, design, or placement of warnings or 
instructions, it would have an incentive to do so. On the other hand, if some 
new or revised warning would be more likely to confuse or annoy drivers 
than to educate them, the automaker would be incentivized under enterprise 
liability not to add that sort of unhelpful warning—even if it would have 
gotten the automaker “off the hook” under a more traditional negligence-
based warning-defect standard. Automakers would do whatever works best 
to reduce accident costs, which would redound to their benefit as reduced 
auto-accident claim payouts over time. 
In addition, enterprise liability could incentivize automakers to restructure 
the ways that automobiles are insured and sold in order to improve driver 
care and activity levels. First, consider how an enterprise liability regime 
might affect how auto insurance is provided. Note that under an enterprise 
liability regime automakers would have an incentive to shift contractually 
much of the expected costs of auto accidents to auto insurers. This somewhat 
counterintuitive result flows from the fact that auto insurers’ have a 
comparative advantage with respect to monitoring and regulating driver 
care- and activity-levels. If automakers could get auto insurers to take on 
somewhat more of the risk of auto accidents, the insurers would have a strong 
incentive to help drivers reduce expected accident costs. That is, because of 
competition for customers in the insurance industry, auto insurers would be 
incentivized to use the tools at their disposal—including individualized, 
driving-behaviorally-sensitive, risk-adjusted insurance premiums—in ways 
that would tend to encourage better driving habits and perhaps less driving, 
especially by high risk drivers.87 
 
 86. It is a standard conclusion of deterrence theory that enterprise liability would 
provide strong incentives for manufacturers to develop effective warnings. Croley & 
Hanson, supra note 68, at 786–792. 
 87. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 51, at 220–223. 
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What does this mean for how auto insurance would be sold? Auto 
insurance under an enterprise liability regime might be sold in the same way 
that it is today. An individual auto purchaser, in other words, might pay the 
automaker one price for the vehicle itself and then purchase a separate auto 
insurance policy at the same time from a separate auto insurance company. 
However, given that automakers would be ultimately responsible legally 
(through the doctrine of subrogation) for the auto-accident losses paid by the 
auto insurers, there would be strong incentives for contractual coordination 
between automakers and auto insurers. Individual auto manufacturers might 
even be induced to partner with particular auto insurers in an effort to offer 
the best, most competitively priced, combined product of vehicle and 
vehicle-insurance coverage.88 
Another way that enterprise liability could improve driver care and 
activity levels is through its effect on how automobiles are sold. For example, 
the introduction of an enterprise liability regime might push the automotive 
industry in the direction of lease transactions rather than outright sales. This 
is because leasing would make it easier for automakers to enforce the terms 
of the auto insurance policies, which again might be sold by an insurer who 
was contractually partnered with the automaker. Under a lease arrangement, 
for example, if a driver became uninsurable (because of bad driving behavior 
and/or increased claim payouts), or if the driver simply stopped paying her 
premiums, there might be a provision in the lease empowering the automaker 
to reclaim the vehicle. 
In addition to favoring leasehold arrangements, the introduction of 
enterprise liability might create market pressure on auto manufacturers to 
sell vehicles to commercial purchasers rather than individual consumers. 
That is, automakers under enterprise liability might be incentivized to sell to 
commercial entities—fleet operators—who would agree contractually to 
indemnify the manufacturer for any enterprise liability payments made to 
victims harmed by vehicles in their fleets. These commercial purchasers, in 
turn, would either lease the vehicles to individual drivers or perhaps make 
them available through ride-share arrangements. Automakers in turn could 
be incentivized to choose commercial purchasers who are financially 
 
 88. Why are automakers and auto insurers not incentivized now, without the 
adoption of enterprise liability, to coordinate in the way described in the text? This is a 
fair question, one that I have put to representatives of both industries and to which I have 
yet to get a good answer. I suspect that under current legal rules and market conditions, 
those incentives are dampened. Automakers can largely avoid liability by complying 
with the largely negligence-based product liability rules, and auto insurers make profits 
from insuring the residual accident risk. Neither industry—car makers or car insurers—
are being forced to bear the full losses of auto accidents. In addition, because much of 
the risk of auto accidents are externalized by drivers to their non-auto first-party insurers, 
as discussed above, there is little demand-side incentive for either industry to coordinate 
with the other. 
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responsible and would be incentivized to purchase efficient auto insurance 
contracts to cover the enterprise liability payouts. Such a trend toward 
commercial fleets would be consistent with already existing market trends 
towards ride-sharing companies, which trends are expected to accelerate 
with the advent of Level 5 vehicles.89 
I am not suggesting that comprehensive automaker enterprise liability 
would necessarily result in auto lease arrangements replacing individual 
sales, or ride sharing replacing driving. Rather, the point is that, once 
automakers are made legally responsible for the cost of auto accidents (or 
for most of those costs), they will have an incentive (and the ability) to 
structure automobile distribution markets in ways that are closer the social 
optimal. 
IV. CAVEATS, CONCERNS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The description I have given here of an automaker enterprise liability 
regime is necessarily only a rough outline of an idea, a jumping off point for 
further discussion. The actual design of such a program would require 
empirical research into a range of topics, including whether shifting to 
enterprise liability would actually, and not just theoretically, produce 
substantial deterrence benefits. Among the other questions that would need 
to be answered include the following: 
Under any real-world version of an automaker enterprise liability regime, 
there is the question of how long the automakers’ responsibility for insuring 
their vehicles would remain in effect. Would it be for the useful life of the 
vehicle or for some set period of time, say, ten years? If for some set period 
of time, who then would be responsible for covering the accidents arising out 
of the use of the vehicle? Also, what would the precise relationship be 
between an automaker enterprise liability regime and state mandatory 
insurance/financial responsibility laws? Presumably, rescission of coverage 
by the insurer due to excessive accident experience or failure to pay 
premiums would result in a suspension of driving privileges, but how would 
that be enforced? All good questions. 
Similarly, if an auto enterprise liability regime were adopted, would it in 
fact have a grandfather provision perhaps exempting all vehicles 
manufactured and sold before a given date, as suggested above? Or would 
older vehicles made before the new law goes into effect be transitioned into 
the new regime over time? If older vehicles were fully exempted from (or 
grandfathered out of) the new regime, how would we deal with the resulting, 
 
 89. Andrew G. Simpson, If They Try It, They’ll Like It: How Ridesharing, 
Autonomous Cars Will Win Over the Public, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/01/23/478073.htm. 
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potentially large, price differential between new vehicles (which would be 
priced with full accident costs internalized into the purchase price) and used 
vehicles (which would not be)? What role could increased mandatory 
minimum levels of auto insurance play in assisting with that transition?90 
There is also a whole range of question regarding how an automaker 
enterprise liability regime would deal with the threat of auto crashes (or 
stolen or destroyed data) resulting from criminal hacking of a connected 
system. Existing and growing markets in cyber insurance coverage might be 
able to handle the risks of posed to data stored in the vehicles, but the market 
may have more difficulty covering cyber risks to life, limb, and property.91 
Solutions range from expanding the role of the federal government as a 
reinsurer of last resort to limiting liability for cyber-related physical risks to 
the amount of mandatory liability insurance coverage. All of these details, 
and many others, would need to be addressed before any comprehensive 
automaker enterprise liability regime could seriously be considered. 
The final concern raised by the idea of an automaker enterprise liability 
regime involves the cost. The concern is not that the “experienced” price of 
autos would rise, although that would certainly be true in the short run. As 
already noted,92 such a price increase would be the source of much of the 
deterrence benefit of an enterprise liability regime, the mechanism through 
which deterrence would work, incentives for accident-avoidance optimized. 
Rather, the concern has to do with the problem of affordability. For some 
households, owning an automobile is already unaffordable, which is a source 
of hardship and an obstacle to social mobility. For those households, a 
program that raised the price of autos, even in an effort to make them safer, 
may not be a welcome change without some form of compensating subsidy. 
My own view is that some type of taxpayer funded transportation subsidies 
 
 90. An alternative to a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability regime would 
be simply to increase auto insurance mandates to provide coverage closer to what would 
be provided under an enterprise liability regime. Such a regime could be made 
comprehensive, in the sense that it would apply both to human-driven and computer-
driven vehicles, with perhaps higher repair cost minimum coverage for Level 5 vehicles. 
A comprehensive mandatory auto insurance regime could also replace all of existing 
automaker liability and driver liability law in much the same way as I propose for auto 
enterprise liability and would also likely result in contractual coordination between the 
automakers and the auto insurers to provide the best combination of auto safety and auto-
crash risk coverage. A full discussion of this auto-insurance-mandate alternative to 
automaker enterprise liability is of course beyond the scope of this Article. 
 91. Most cyber polices include exclusions for physical damages to persons or 
property. John Buchanan, Dustin Cho, and Patrick Rawsthorne, When Things Get 
Hacked: Coverage for Cyber Physical Risks, 2018 A.B.A. LITIG. SEC., INS. COVERAGE 
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 92. See supra discussion at note 81. 
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for the low-income drivers may indeed be desirable (from a social justice 
perspective), whether or not an automaker enterprise liability regime were 
adopted. But that topic too must await another day. 
